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Agriculture was included in multilateral trade negotiations in a comprehen-
sive manner for the first time in the Uruguay Round. While this was an impor-
tant step in bringing agriculture into the mainstream of liberalising trade
reform, the actual degree to which the Uruguay Round succeeded in liberal-
ising trade and reducing market distortions has been relatively minor. In fact,
agricultural support in OECD countries, as measured by the OECD’s Producer
Support Estimate (PSE), is currently at very high levels — similar to the levels
prevailing at the commencement of the Uruguay Round in 1986. Therefore,
the cuts in tariffs, export subsidies and domestic support negotiated in the
Uruguay Round would appear to have had very little impact on overall levels
of support for agriculture. The Uruguay Round did, however, establish a frame-
work for negotiating further reductions in support and that framework is likely
to be essential in the current agricultural negotiations.
The dairy industry is one of the most highly supported agricultural industries
globally. While there were some increases in market access and reductions in
volumes of export subsidies negotiated in the Uruguay Round, world dairy
trade remains highly distorted. The current WTO agricultural negotiations
provide a vital opportunity to liberalise world dairy policies and trade. The
potential impacts of significant dairy liberalisation are highlighted using an
analysis of possible scenarios for improved market access for dairy product
markets.The inclusion of agriculture in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations held
prospects of achieving significant progress on reducing the policy induced distortions to
agricultural trade that plagued world trade during the 1980s and 1990s. However, the
results of the Uruguay Round have been somewhat mixed. Tariff rate import quotas for
agricultural products were introduced to provide minimum access opportunities that either
did not previously exist or were limited. Tariff quotas were also used to maintain existing
access levels. Some progress was made in reducing the volumes of subsidised exports on
world markets. However, progress in reducing import barriers and domestic support has
been minimal. Consequently, agricultural support levels are currently as high as they were
at the commencement of the Uruguay Round in the mid-1980s. This is particularly true
for dairy products.
With little progress on liberalising dairy trade to date, the current WTO agricultural nego-
tiations represent a critical opportunity to address the policy induced production and trade
distortions in the world dairy industry. As dairy remains one of the most highly distorted
agricultural industries globally the focus in this paper is on the prospects for liberalisation
for dairy products.
Progress in the Uruguay Round
The extent of liberalisation arising from tariff cuts and reductions in domestic support has
been extremely disappointing. The cuts to both tariffs and domestic support were from
average levels in the 1986–88 base period. This period, however, was one of extremely
high levels of support and depressed world prices. Therefore, even substantial reductions
would leave high levels of support (Roberts et al. 1999).
An integral part of the market access commitments of the Uruguay Round involved convert-
ing nontariff barriers to tariff equivalents and reducing the resulting tariffs. However, the
effectiveness of this tariffication strategy was significantly eroded by the process of ‘dirty
tariffication’. This is where tariff equivalents that were introduced were much higher than
the nontariff barriers that they were replacing (see Ingco 1995 for a discussion of dirty
tariffication). This can arise from the range of internal and external market prices that
might be used to determine tariff equivalents in the base period. For example, a country
wishing to maintain high protection for a product could use base period quotations for a
high quality product at a remote location where prices are well above average or repre-
sentative levels for the country. At the same time an import price for a low quality product
at a port where prices were lower than in most other parts of the country could also be
used. The result was to make the tariff equivalents in the base period well above repre-
sentative levels. Ingco concluded, for example, that the European Union and the United
States set initial tariff bindings at unweighted average levels of 61 per cent and 44 per cent
above actual tariff equivalents respectively.
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tions in domestic support has been significantly diminished by aggregation of commit-
ments across the whole agricultural sector and the many exemptions to cuts in domestic
support. As the agreed cuts to domestic support were for agriculture as a whole and as
levels of support for individual items can vary widely over time as market conditions fluc-
tuate, there is a great deal of room for transferring support from commodity to commodity
over time. This flexibility was enhanced by the great height of domestic support in the
base period. The issue of aggregation of domestic support and reductions in aggregate
measured support from unrepresentative high levels has meant that constraints on actual
domestic support in the major developed countries have so far been minimal.
Beyond these factors, the agreement provides for many exemptions from cuts to domestic
support. Significant exemptions have been granted for ‘decoupled’ support (a component
of ‘green box’ support) and support subject to production limitations (‘blue box’ support).
Decoupled support refers to payments that are not related to current production levels,
output prices, input use or input prices. Since the early 1990s, there has been a trend toward
support that is decoupled to a greater or lesser extent. Whether this represents a marked
advance in reducing support induced market distortions depends on whether the support
payments are made in ways that are generally minimally market distorting or whether they
could lock in or extend existing distortions.
The exemptions under the ‘blue box’, or production limiting arrangements, were written
into the WTO Agreement on Agriculture after they had been negotiated bilaterally between
the European Union and the United States in the Blair House Accord. Under the exemption
(WTO 1995), ‘Direct payments under production-limiting programs should not be subject
to (the agreed) commitment to reduce domestic support if:
(i) such payments are based on fixed area and yields; or
(ii) such payments are made on 85 per cent or less of the base level of production; or
(iii) livestock payments are made on a fixed number of head.’
The important issues with production limiting arrangements are the level from which
production has been limited and the extent to which the structure of support continues to
distort production and markets. Although the arrangement might limit production to below
what it would have been with open ended price support of the same incidence, it is being
used to maintain production at levels that greatly exceed what they would be if there had
been, and continued to be, no support.
The limitations of the Uruguay Round discussed above are reflected in the high levels of
agricultural support that still remain (figure 1). While OECD protection levels declined
in the mid-1990s, a period of relatively high world prices, protection increased signifi-
cantly in the late 1990s, and is now at levels similar to those in the mid-1980s.
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International dairy markets have been highly
distorted by protectionist policies in many
countries, particularly developed countries, and
dairy is one of the most highly protected agri-
cultural sectors in OECD countries (figure 2:
OECD 2000). This situation is hardly new, with
support for dairy industries around the world
being entrenched for many decades. The fact
that support levels for dairy remain extremely
high illustrates that the Uruguay Round
achieved only limited progress in reducing
policy induced distortions in world dairy trade.
As such, the current WTO agriculture negotia-
tions provide an important opportunity to liber-
alise world dairy trade and so obtain the bene-
fits that arise from more open trade
Dairy liberalisation in the Uruguay Round
The main areas of progress from the Uruguay Round were the relatively small increases in
market access that were agreed and the limitations and reductions in the volumes of
subsidised exports. The Uruguay Round, however, did very little to address the distorted
production incentives that prevail in many OECD countries.
The European Union
Internal EU prices under the Common Agricultural Policy are supported at very high levels
relative to world prices through restrictions on access to the EU market, and the use of
export subsidies on exports of dairy products.
Until 1994, restrictions on imports were
primarily through variable levies that prevented
entry of all but permitted quantities, predomi-
nantly a quota on New Zealand butter and
quotas on specified cheese from a number of
countries. As a result of the WTO Agreement
on Agriculture, the variable import levies for
dairy products were replaced by tariff rate
quotas. A small in-quota tariff is applied on a
limited quantity of imports. Beyond this quan-
tity a very high above-quota tariff is applied.
The above-quota tariff either prevents addi-
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Figure 1: Estimated nominal rates of 

















Figure 2: OECD agricultural support:
main commodities









a Estimates are for 24 OECD countries which include the
15 EU members, Switzerland, Norway, Iceland, Turkey,
Canada, the United States, Japan, Australia and New
Zealand. The estimate for 1965–74 was derived from a
comparison of data from Tyers and Anderson (1992) with
OECD data for later years. As the OECD introduced a new
method of calculation, data before 1997 were rebased on a
value basis to be comparable with the newer data.tional imports or ensures that any imports beyond the tariff quota enter the European Union
at a duty paid price that does not undermine EU domestic prices.
The tariff rate quota for butter was set at 76 700 tonnes a year. For cheese, there was an
appreciable increase in imports permitted, with minimum access tariff rate quotas rising
from 15 300 tonnes in 1995 to 83 400 tonnes in 2000. Although the increase in permitted
imports under minimum access tariff-quotas for cheese is large in percentage terms, it is
small both relative to EU consumption of some 5.2 million tonnes a year and world trade
of around 1 million tonnes a year. The resulting tariff quotas still restrict access through
the limited access quantities, high in-quota tariff rates, and extremely high above-quota
tariff rates (table 1). The very high above-quota tariff rates meant that the agreed tariff
reductions have had no effect on access to the EU market.
The other EU commitment for dairy products in the Uruguay Round was for a reduction in
the volumes of subsidised exports. As the base period for establishing the cuts to export
subsidies for both butter and skim milk powder (1986–90) was a period of very high levels
of export subsidies, the limits negotiated on EU subsidised exports were well above actual
EU exports in the first half of the 1990s as can be seen from table 2. As a result, the export
subsidy commitments for butter have not been binding during the implementation period
— in fact the European Union had the capacity to significantly increase volumes of
subsidised butter exports from levels in the early 1990s and still meet commitments for
2000 and beyond. EU commitments on subsidised skim milk powder exports have only
become effective toward the end of the period. The limits on volumes of subsidised exports
of cheese, however, have had impacts through the implementation period.
While the volume of subsidised dairy exports has been reduced, the European Union is
still able to export large quantities with the assistance of export subsidies. These quantities
are considerably larger than the market access quantities provided through tariff rate quotas.
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Table 1: EU tariff quotas for dairy products
Current Minimum
access access quantity In-quota tariff Above-quota tariff
1995 2000 1995 2000 1995 2000
kt kt kt /t /t /t /t
Butter (current access) 76.7 868.8 a 868.8 a 3 614 b 2 313 b
Butter (minimum access) 0 10.0 948.0 948.0
Cheese 18.8 18.0 104.0 137.5– 137.5– 2 264– 1 449–
170.6 170.6 3 456 2 212
Skim milk powder 41.0 69.0 475 475 1 485 1 188
a Rates depend on type, packaging and intended use. b For a fat content not exceeding 85 per cent, 1896 /t, and for a fat content
exceeding 85 per cent, 2313 /t.
Source: WTO (1994).United States
Under the WTO Agreement on Agriculture
the United States undertook to implement
import tariff-quotas on butter rising from
4000 tonnes in 1995 to 7000 tonnes in
2000 and for butter oil, rising from 3500
tonnes in 1995 to 6100 tonnes in 2000.
Taken together, the 2000 amounts total only
about 2 per cent of US butter production.
The tariff-quota limitations on US imports
of milk powders are similarly small and the
beyond tariff-quota tariffs are highly
restrictive (table 3).
US exports of dairy products in recent years have occurred primarily with the aid of export
subsidies provided under the Dairy Export Incentive Program. Under the program, exporters
bid for bonuses for sale to specified targeted regions. Those bonuses are necessary to
bridge the gap between the internal supported prices and prices obtainable on the markets
to which they are directed.
While the United States has WTO commitments on volumes of subsidised exports of dairy
products (table 4), US subsidised exports of skim milk powder exceeded the permitted
WTO maximum for 1998-99. This was possible because article 9.2(b) of the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture has been interpreted as allowing countries that had subsidised
less than their permitted maximum quantity in previous years in the implementation period
to exceed the annual prescribed maximum in later years. The United States used this lati-
tude in 1998 and 1999 (US Department of Agriculture 1999a) (figure 3). However, it is
clear from the agreement that the maximum for the final year of the implementation period,
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Table 2: EU subsidised dairy product exports
and WTO commitments
Average WTO maximum volume
annual exports of subsidised exports
1991–94 1995 2000
kt kt kt
Butter 224 488 399
Cheese 450 426 321
Skim milk powder 217 335 272
Source: European Commission (1997).
Table 3: US tariff quotas for dairy products
Current Minimum
access access quantity In-quota tariff Above-quota tariff
1995 2000 1995 2000 Base duty Bound duty
kt kt kt USc/kg USc/kg USc/kg USc/kg
Butter 0.3 4.0 7.0 12.3 12.3 181.3 154.1
Butter oil 3.5 6.1 10% 10% 219.4+10% 1.865+8.5%
Cheese 114.0 135.0 10% 10% 144.3 a 122.7 a
Skim milk powder b 1.3 5.3 3.3 3.3 86.5 86.5
Wholemilk powder b 0.4 3.3 6.8 6.8 109.2 109.2
a Above-quota tariff rates quoted are for cheddar cheese. Different rates apply for other types of cheese. b In addition to the milk
powder quantities shown, Mexico has access of a total 422 tonnes of skim and wholemilk powder.
Sources: WTO (1994); Young (1994).the 2000 marketing year (typically 2000-01), cannot be exceeded. In contrast, subsidised
US butter exports have been below the permitted WTO maximum throughout the imple-
mentation period so far.
Along with limits on imports and subsidised exports, the US support system at the national
level involves setting minimum support prices for milk. In the 1996 US FAIR Act support
prices for milk were to be phased down from US$10.35 per 100 pounds in 1996 to US$9.90
per 100 pounds in 1999. However, the import barriers and export subsidies have been
more than enough to support the internal price for milk at substantially above those levels.
For example, between 1995 and 1997, the average annual price for manufacturing grade
milk varied between US$11.79 per 100 pounds and US$13.43 per 100 pounds and in 1998,
when seasonal conditions were adverse, prices rose to a peak of US$17.40 per 100 pounds
in December (US Department of Agriculture 1999b).
The US support arrangements for dairy prod-
ucts are strongly entrenched. Although reduc-
tions in domestic support prices, as opposed
to actual market prices, might be considered
by some to be indicative of efforts to reduce
support, current barriers to imports and export
subsidies are clearly sufficient to support inter-
nal prices at around historical levels or above.
Without marked reductions in the barriers to
imports, this system will remain highly
distorting.
Japan and Korea
The Uruguay Round has done very little to reduce the high levels of protection provided to
the Japanese and Korean dairy industries. While the Japanese market access commitments
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Table 4: United States: subsidised exports of skim milk powder and butter and WTO limits
Skim milk powder Butter
US subsidised  US subsidised
exports WTO limit exports WTO limit
kt kt kt kt
Average 1990-91 to 1993-94 99.6 42.5
1995-96 63.7 108.2 0 43.0
1996-97 69.8 100.2 7.6 38.6
1997-98 92.8 92.2 15.6 34.2
1998-99 129.8 84.2 0.4 29.9
1999-00 101.4 76.2 5.3 25.5
2000-01 12.8 a 68.2 0 a 21.1
a Until 8 December 2000.
Sources: Young (1994); US Department of Agriculture (2000).



















Subsidised exportsare somewhat higher than those of the European Union and United States, they remain
limited (table 5). In addition, quota tariff rates remain extremely high and so imports
beyond the tariff-quota quantities are not feasible. Like Japan, Korean access quantities
are very small, while above-quota tariffs remain high.
Liberalising global dairy trade
High levels of support to the dairy industry have become entrenched internationally and
efforts to liberalise the sector have not been successful to date. The current WTO
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Table 5: Japanese and Korean tariff quotas for dairy products
Minimum
access quantity In-quota tariff Above-quota tariff




– for school lunch program 7.3 7.3 Free Free 466¥/kg 396¥/kg
– other 85.9 85.9 0–35% a 0–35% a 25–35%+ 29.8%+
466¥/kg 396¥/kg
Designated dairy products, 137.2 137.2 35%+  35%+
milk equivalent b markup markup c
Other dairy products – general use
– milk equivalent 124.6 133.9 25–35% 25–35%
Whey for feed 18.5 d 45.0 free free 25–35%+ 21.3–29.8%+
470 – 400 –
1204¥/kg 1023¥/kg
Whey for infant formula 12.0 d 25.0 10% 10% 25–35%+ 21.3–29.8%+
470 – 400 –
1204¥/kg 1023¥/kg
Butter and butteroil 1.9 1.9 35% 35% 35%+ 29.8%+
1159 – 985 –
1363¥/kg 1159¥/kg
Prepared edible fat,
30–70% fat 17.1 d 19.0 25% 25% 35%+ 29.8%+
1159¥/kg 985¥/kg
Republic of Korea
Butter 0.3 0.4 99.0% 89.0%
Cheese 40.0% 36.0%
Skim milk powder 0.6 1.0 20% 20% 220.0% 176.0%
Wholemilk powder 0.3 0.6 40% 40% 220.0% 176.0%
Whey powder 23.0 54.2 20% 20% 99.0% 49.5%
a Actual rate depends on whether sugar is added, butterfat content and use. b Japan has undertaken to import at least three-quarters
of this amount each year as butter and skim milk powder. This is separate from the skim milk powder tariff rate quotas. c In addition
to the 35 per cent tariff, the Japanese government can charge a markup on sales within Japan of up to 358¥/kg, with the markup
declining by 9¥/kg a year over the implementation period. d Final quota quantity was effective from Japanese fiscal year 1995.
Source: WTO (1994).agricultural negotiations provide an opportunity to make progress in substantially reducing
the significant distortions to trade that remain in place. This is clearly not an easy task —
the lack of progress on dairy during the Uruguay Round illustrates this, as does the lack
of progress in liberalising the dairy sector in the European Union as part of the Agenda
2000 process.
While progress in achieving more liberal and open global dairy markets is likely to remain
slow, it is important to clearly identify the potential impacts and benefits of liberalisation.
Key elements requiring close examination are improvements to market access for dairy
products and elimination of export subsidies. When considering market access issues for
dairy products it is clearly important to address the very high import barriers imposed by
developed countries such as the United Sates, the European Union and Japan. However, it
is also critical to examine import barriers imposed by developing countries. On the export
subsidy front, the key countries of concern remain the European Union and the United
States.
ABARE’s Global Trade and Environment Model (GTEM) has been used to assess the
economic impacts of continuing agricultural liberalisation. GTEM is a multiregion, multi-
sector dynamic general equilibrium model of the world economy. It is derived from the
MEGABARE model (ABARE 1996) and GTAP (Hertel 1997). The model code is avail-
able on ABARE’s website (www.abareconomics.com) and a nontechnical description is
provided in Freeman et al. (2000). GTEM uses version 4e of the GTAP database. The stan-
dard GTAP database has been modified to improve the representation of the economic
structure and policies in the 1995 base period. These developments are reported in Freeman
et al. (2000).
Before assessing the impacts of policy changes it is necessary to construct a baseline or
reference case scenario to project likely levels of output, trade and other variables in the
absence of policy changes. This scenario projects the situation in the absence of any further
multilateral reform beyond that agreed in the Uruguay Round. The reference case provides
a benchmark against which alternative reform scenarios can be compared and is projected
for the period 1995–2010.
GTEM has been used to assess the impacts of a further 50 per cent reduction in tariff equiv-
alents, domestic support and the value of subsidised exports in all countries over and above
the agreed Uruguay Round commitments. It is assumed here that the reductions are phased
in evenly over six years from 2005. An important assumption is that reductions in support
have an immediate effect — there is no ‘water’ in the tariff, implying that tariffs are fully
reflected in internal prices. Given the prevalence of dirty tariffication in the Uruguay Round
discussed earlier, ABARE’s results may overstate the impact of reform to the extent that
these assumptions are not realistic.
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considerable scope for benefits from reform. In the European Union the reduction in border
measures would not fully erode the quota rents available to producers through the current
milk production quota system. Therefore, EU milk production is assumed to remain
constant in the simulation. However, farm level milk production would be reduced margin-
ally in North America and Japan, indicating that domestic dairy industries would not be
decimated in liberalising countries. Lower domestic prices from reform also contribute to
increased consumption of dairy products. In response to market access reforms, opening up
of markets where imports are currently suppressed would increase imports greatly rela-
tive to the reference case. The largest expected increase in imports would be in Japan, the
United States and Canada, and there would be some increase in EU imports (table 6). It
is estimated that the value of exports would increase in all major dairy exporting coun-
tries, with the largest percentage growth
being in New Zealand and Australia, but
appreciable increases would also occur in
the United States.
The results presented here indicate that
substantial gains can be achieved from
further liberalisation. However, this analy-
sis only provides general indications of
impacts. In particular, in GTEM the dairy
sector is incorporated as two products —
raw milk and dairy products. In addition,
the array of tariff-rate quotas prevalent in
the global dairy market have not been
incorporated into this analysis. Given the
potential impacts of greater dairy liberali-
sation from the GTEM analysis, further
research on those impacts would appear to
be warranted to build a convincing case for significant liberalisation of the dairy sector as
part of the current WTO agricultural negotiations.
As part of this effort, ABARE is currently working on enhancing the dairy module of the
OECD Aglink model for use in analysis of WTO liberalisation. A key feature of the Aglink
dairy module is the representation of specific dairy products, including milk, butter, cheese,
skim milk powder, whole milk powder, casein and fresh dairy products. This provides an
avenue to develop more product focused analysis of dairy trade liberalisation, particularly
as commitments for both market access and export subsidies are on a product basis. To
facilitate such analysis, part of the ABARE work is focused on incorporating tariff-rate
quotas into the dairy import demand equations for the countries already represented in
Aglink. As the standard Aglink model covers mainly OECD dairy markets a key aspect
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Table 6: Dairy products: changes in value of
trade from a 50 per cent reduction in agri-
cultural support, 2010
Change in value






European Union 11 10
Japan 99
New Zealand 39
United States 18 56
Rest of Latin America a 23
a Includes Mexico, Chile, Central America, Venezuela, Colombia,
Rest of Andean Pact, Rest of South America, Uruguay.
Source: Freeman et al. (2000).of the ABARE development work is the inclusion of import demand equations for the four
main dairy products, butter, cheese, skim milk powder and wholemilk powder, for non-
OECD countries. The import demand equations incorporate tariffs, and where applicable
tariff quotas, in India and major importing countries in South America, Asia, Africa and the
Middle East. Developing both the policy and country representation in the Aglink dairy
module will provide a comprehensive modeling framework for analysing possible dairy
liberalisation as part of the current WTO agriculture negotiations.
References
ABARE 1996, The MEGABARE Model: Interim Documentation, Canberra.
European Commission 1997, Situation and Outlook: Dairy Sector, CAP 2000 Working
Documents, Directorate-General for Agriculture, Brussels, April.
Freeman, F., Mélanie, J., Roberts, I., Vanzetti, D., Tielu, A. and Buetre, B. 2000, The
Impact of Agricultural Trade Liberalisation on Developing Countries, ABARE Research
Report 2000.6, Canberra.
Hertel, T. (ed.) 1997, Global Trade Analysis: Modeling and Applications, Cambridge
University Press, Massachusetts.
Ingco, M. 1995, Agricultural trade liberalisation in the Uruguay Round: one step forward,
one step back? Supplementary paper prepared for ‘The Uruguay Round and Developing
Countries’, A World Bank Conference, Washington DC, 26–27 January.
OECD 2000, Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: Monitoring and Evaluation 2000,
Paris.
Roberts, I., Podbury, T., Freeman, F., Tielu, A., Vanzetti, D., Andrews, N., Melanie, J. and
Hinchy, M. 1999, Reforming World Agricultural Trade Policies, ABARE Research
Report 99.12, Canberra.
Tyers, R. and Anderson, K. 1992, Disarray in World Food Markets: A Quantitative Assess-
ment, Cambridge University Press, England.
US Department of Agriculture 1999a, ‘Glickman announces additional dairy tonnage avail-
able under DEIP’, FAS Online, Release no. 0212.99, FAS PR 0152-99, 17/5/99,
Washington DC.
—— 1999b, Agricultural Outlook June–July, Economic Research Service, Washington
DC.
—— 2000, FAS Online, Washington DC, (http://www.fas.usda.gov/.
ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 2001.2
11WTO 1994, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Legal Instruments
Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations Done
at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994, Geneva.
—— 1995, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: The
Legal Texts, Geneva.
Young, E. 1994, Uruguay Round Outcomes: Agriculture, Agriculture Branch, Trade
Negotiations and Organisations Division, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Canberra.
ABARE CONFERENCE PAPER 2001.2
12